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Speedy Trial and the Congested Trial Calendar
In People v. Ganci,' the defendant had been indicted for robbery, lar-
ceny, and assault2 while serving a prison sentence for another conviction.3
Five and one-half months after his indictment he moved, pursuant to sec-
tion 668 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss for fail-
ure to prosecute.4 Eleven months later, sixteen months after the indict-
ment, he was brought to trial,5 convicted, and sentenced.' On appeal, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Depart-
ment affirmed,7 whereupon the defendant appealed by permission to the
New York Court of Appeals. On this appeal he contended that the delay
deprived him of his federal constitutional and New York statutory right to
a speedy trial. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the delay
was attributable to the congestion of the criminal trial calendar brought
about by a policy of processing indictments in the sequence of their pre-
sentment.' The majority held that such a delay constitutes "good cause"
for not dismissing the indictment 9 under the New York statute.
I
The right to a speedy trial is an undisputed requirement of criminal jus-
tice.'0 It was originally articulated in the Magna Carta in 1215." In
1679, the English Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act, ' 2 which pro-
vided for complete discharge for those not indicted and tried by the second
term."3 The right to a speedy trial was incorporated into the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
127 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971).
'The indictment, dated June 1, 1967, related to an armed robbery of a Grand
Union Super Market in Nassau County, New York.
'On April 28, 1967, the defendant was sentenced to five years in prison in Suffolk
County, New York, for another felony. It was while on bail between conviction and
sentence in Suffolk that this present crime was committed on March 18, 1967. He was
promptly returned to Nassau County and arraigned on June 13, 1967.
'N.Y. CODE C.IM. PROC. § 668 (1970), states:
If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been postponed upon
his application, be not brought to trial at the next term of the court in which
the indictment is triable, after it is found that court may on application of the
defendant, order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the con-
trary be shown.
'The trial commenced September 25, 1968, in the Nassau County Court.
'He was sentenced on October 29, 1968.
'People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 459, 33 App. Div. 2d 797, 307 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1969).
'People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971).
OId. at 487.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI declares: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"; N.Y. Civ. Rws. LAW § 12 (McKinney
1948): "In all criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to a speedy trial"; N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 8 (McKinney 1970): "In a criminal action the defendant is
entitled; (1) to a speedy and public trial.. .
U MAGNA CARTA, c. 40 (1215).
"31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
"Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. Rtv. 1587, 1594 (1965).
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Despite the fundamental nature of the right to a speedy trial, 4 the stan-
dard of protection it provides to the accused remains ambiguous. Through
1966, only four Supreme Court decisions had considered the definition of
this right.'5 Each held against the defendant and made little analysis of the
standard to be used in determining whether.the right to a speedy trial had
been violated. In fact, the dicta of these cases declared that the definition
of "speedy" is necessarily relative - the question of whether a delay vio-
lates the right depends on the circumstances. Since 1966, the right to a
speedy trial has been applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment'"
and has been held to apply just as forcefully to convicts already incarcer-
ated on other charges.17 In none of the decisions since 1966, however, has
the Supreme Court extensively analyzed the right to a speedy trial. Thus,
the Court has yet to develop a standard by which trial delay can be mea-
sured and applied to the speedy trial guaranty.'
The court has indicated that whether a trial is "speedy" must be a rela-
tive determination in order to allow for delay that may be deemed reason-
able under the circumstances.'5 It is thus constitutionally permissible to
have lengthy delays, if they are deemed to be "reasonable." Delays caused
24 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). Justice White, representing
the majority of the Court, wrote:
Recent cases applying provisions of the first eight amendments to the states
represent a new approach to the "incorporation" debate, and have reevaluated
the term "fundamental right." Earlier, the Court can be seen as having asked
when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was re-
quired of a state, if a civilized system could be imagined that would not afford
the particular protection.... The recent cases, on the other hand, have pro-
ceeded upon the valid assumption that the state criminal processes are not
imaginary and theoretical schemes, but actual systems bearing virtually every
characteristic of the common law system.... The question thus is whether
given this kind of system, a particular procedure is fundamental or necessary
to an Anglo-American system of ordered liberty. Of immediate relevance
are the court's holdings that the states must comply with certain provisions of
the sixth amendment, specifically that the states may not refuse a speedy
trial....
In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967), C. J. Warren declared:
We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the sixth amendment. That right has its roots at the very
foundation of our English law heritage.... That this right was considered
fundamental at this early period in our history is evidenced by its guarantee
in the constitutions of several states of the new nation as well as by prominant
position in the sixth amendment. . . The history of the right to a speedy trial
and its reception in this country clearly establishes that it is one of the most
basic rights of our Constitution.
'United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S.
1 (1959) ; Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 254 (1957) ; Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S.
77 (1905).
"Klopferv. Norh Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
"Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
"Cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37 (1970), in which Mr. Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, attempted to analyze the scope of the right to a speedy trial by out-
lining the questions that the courts must deal with. He suggests that delay due to con-
gested calendars may deny the accused's right to a speedy trial.
"In United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), the Court held that the delay
must be purposeful and oppressive to allow dismissal; in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S.
77, 87 (1905), the Court declared in dictum that the right to a speedy trial is "con-
sistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances."
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by a defendant 2 or by the disappearance of a material witness have been
held reasonable and therefore inadequate for dismissal.2' There is some
doubt, however, about how long and for what reasons the prosecution can
delay the trial. Consequently, the right of the accused in all criminal prose-
cutions to a speedy trial remains substantially abstract and theoretical.
Thirty-eight state legislatures have attempted to clarify this right by
defining the term "speedy" by statute.22 These statutes, which delimit the
time in which an accused must be brought to trial, are not attempts to cur-
tail the accused's right, but are legislative interpretations of the constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial. Thus, the constitutional and statutory rights
to a speedy trial are essentially the same, except that the statute provides
a more specific frame of reference. The statute merely assists in the deter-
mination of whether the accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated based upon the statutory definition of "speedy." All of the
state statutes follow this pattern.2" The New York statute, for example,
requires trial within the next term of the court in which the indictment was
triable, unless there is "good cause" for delay.24
The purposes and policies underlying both the constitutional and statu-
tory right to a speedy trial are the same. These purposes are: (1) to pru-
tect the accused from prolonged imprisonment for an untried accusation ;21
(2) to secure him from prolonged anxiety and public suspicion caused by
'United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 803 (1962).
_' United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963) (star witness
in India); United States v. Palermo, 27 F.R.D. 393 (S.N.D.Y. 1961) (grand jury wit-
ness missing).
Forty-one states have speedy trial statutes. Three of these simply proscribe "un-
necessary" or "unreasonable" delay (Alaska, Delaware, Oregon). Thirty-eight define
the period of permissible delay by court terms, months, or by days, thus giving the
courts a quantitative measure of the term "speedy." The following table categorizes
the units the various states have used.
Court Terms Months Days Years
Arkansas New York Massachusetts Arizona Louisiana
Colorado No. Carolina (next term after California
Florida No. Dakota 6 months) Illinois
Georgia Ohio Nevada
Hawaii Oklahoma Michigan Washington
Idaho Pennsylvania (next term after
Indiana So. Carolina 6 months)
Iowa Tennessee
Kansas Utah Montana
Maine Virginia New Jersey
Minnesota West Virginia Rhode Island
Nebraska Wisconsin
New Mexico Wyoming
For a graphic illustration of constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial see Note,
Convicts- The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS
L. REv. 828, app. 869 (1964).
' All of the statutes quantitatively defining the term "speedy" provide exceptions
under which the statute will not operate. Some statutes spell out the exceptions in de-
tail, others merely provide an exception if the state shows "good cause" for the delay.
Id. at 839.
, N.Y. CoDE C~aM. Paoc. § 668 (McKinney 1970).
'People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 355, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1955); Note, Con-
victs- The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS L.
REv. 828, 832 (1964).
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a pending accusation;2 (3) to preserve his ability to prove his innocence
at trial;27 (4) to protect him from deteriorization of his status in prison;
and (5) to protect society's interest in orderly and effective administration
of the criminal law." Before People v. Ganci, the issue of whether delay
caused by congested trial calendars should qualify as "good cause' had
not been squarely faced by the United States Supreme Court or the high-
est appellate court of any state, despite the issue's relevance to the purposes
underlying the right to a speedy trial."0
II
In the instant case, the majority acknowledged the defendant's right to
a speedy trial notwithstanding his incarceration on another conviction. It
admitted that the delay was of such gravity that had it been caused by a
failure or inadvertence attributable to the prosecutor, the indictment would
have been dismissed. The court recognized that neither the defendant's
right to a speedy trial, nor the community's right to have criminals
promptly convicted is secured by the congested system of criminal process
as presently constituted. The court blamed the congested trial calendar on
the rapid growth of the Nassau County population, the increase in crime,
and the "state and community lag in providing additional facilities to pro-
cess criminal cases.""' The majority implicitly admitted the merits of the
accused's cause of action by suggesting judicial methods of alleviating the
'Note, Convicts- The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes,
supra note 25.
" Id.
'Note, Extending Smith v. Hooey, 23 ME. L. Rxv. 201, 202 (1971). Some exam-
ples of prejudice suffered by a defendant even though he is in prison on another charge:
(1) He loses his trustee status.
(2) He often is confined to maximum security.
(3) He is treated as a security risk.
(4) Parole opportunities are jeopardized.
(5) He loses any chance to serve present and potential sentences concurrently.
(6) Emotional harm from the threat of further prosecutions once his present sen-
tence is completed are common.
(7) It is difficult for him to learn the exact charges against him, his ability to pre-
serve evidence and to follow the movement of his witnesses, thus making prepa-
ration of a defense very difficult.
(8) He may lose incentive to complete his rehabilitation.
'Note, Convicts -The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes,
supra note 25.
The following state courts have considered the issue. State v. Churchill, 313 P.2d
753 (Ariz. 1965) (absence of trial judges and consequent inability of the court to try
certain cases because of the heavy work load and congestion constituted good cause for
continuance); Castle v. State, 237 Ind. 83, 143 N.E.2d 570 (1957) (lack of access to
a court room and a congested calendar constituted good cause for dismissal of the charge
against the accused as it denied him his right to a speedy trial); People v. Lanigan, 133
P.2d 24, 22 Cal.2d 569 (Cal. App. 1943) (dealt with the speedy trial guarantee and
the congested trial calendar but was decided before the congestion problem was so acute)
(The Calif. Supreme Court has not decided the issue.); People v. Winters, 18 Misc.2d
205, 182 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1958), (In dicta the court declared that calendar congestion
delay did not deny an accused his right to a speedy trial). See also, James v. Superior
Court, 202 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1964).




congestion problem. 2 Despite these findings, the court held that calendar
congestion constitutes good cause for delay and that delay caused by calen-
dar congestion does not violate the constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial. The court reasoned that the constitutional and statutory
right to a speedy trial is designed to prevent laches on the part of the prose-
cution,3" and that to mandate the legislature to meet its fiscal responsibility
to the legal system by dismissing indictments would produce dire conse-
quences. 4
III
The court's holding that congested trial calendars are good cause for
delay fails to consider the basic policies underlying the constitutional right.
The two reasons presented by the majority for concluding that delays
caused by congested calendars do not violate the right to a speedy trial are
tenuous. Additional policy considerations also militate against calendar
congestion as a good cause for delay.
A. Congested Trial Calendars do not Constitute Good Cause for Delay
In accommodating the legal system's problem, the Ganci court disre-
garded the purposes of the United States constitutional and the New York
statutory right to a speedy trial. Calendar congestion, unlike causes for
delay previously accepted as valid,3" is neither attributable to the accused
nor beyond the possibility of control by the system of criminal justice. 6
Delay caused by the accused's incompetency to stand trial or by the dis-
appearance of a material witness is not comparable to delay caused by the
inability of the criminal system to cope with the problems it has been estab-
lished to regulate. Delay caused by calendar congestion is not beyond the
1Id. at 487.
The majority follows the line of cases holding that the speedy trial guarantee is only
to prevent prosecutorial laches. Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955) ;
State v. Huhnhausen, 201 Ore. 506, 272 P.2d 225 (1954); People ex. rel. Tanic v.
Daley, 30 N.Y. Crim. 47, 142 N.Y.S. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
'
4 People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, 488 (1971).
The defense counsel suggested in his brief that the release of several defendants would
encourage the legislature to provide the necessary funds. This is undoubtedly the "spar-
tan process" that the court is afraid will produce "dire results." Although the court
does not elaborate on dire results, one can imagine that they concern the release of a
large number of criminals. Release for delay caused by congested calendars would
create a situation encouraging offenders to commit crimes in order to congest calendars
or complicate the problem. The answer to the problem, however, is not to do away with
the speedy trial guarantee, but to develop the judicial system to the point that it can
fulfill its function without allowing abuse by the accused or by the system. To allow
the speedy trial guarantee to, in effect, be done away with because there are too many
criminals would be excellent precedent for systematic elimination of the exclusionary role
by the police effectuating as many illegal searches and seizures as possible, thus loosing
criminals on society.
' With an increased population and crime rate it is difficult to maintain an efficientjudicial system. The physical difficulties in bringing an acused to trial, however, do not
override the fundamental right to a speedy trial. Cf. People v. Sylvester, 50 Misc. 2d
677, 271 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1966).
' See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
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control of the system and several possible methods of coping with it have
been suggested."7
B. The Right to a Speedy Trial Should Prevent All Causes of
Delay not just Judicial or Prosecutorial Laches
To argue that the speedy trial guaranty is violated only when the delay
is due to judicial or prosecutorial neglect exalts the cause of the delay to
the exclusion of the nature and severity of the injury to the accused. The
majority's opinion that there is good cause for delay if the delay is beyond
the control of the prosecutor is fallacious on two grounds: (1) it fails to
recognize that there are methods available to the prosecution to alleviate
this problem of court congestion;"8 (2) and more importantly, it fails to
recognize that when the system of criminal justice as a whole is at fault in
causing the delay, it is the obligation of that system to eliminate it. In the
American criminal system, the state not only has a duty to initiate the
action against the accused and to see that he is arraigned, but also has a
duty to see that he is speedily brought to trial. 9 The inability of one part
of the system, the prosecutor, to stop delays should not excuse other parts
of the system, the legislature and the governor, for failing to eliminate the
cause of the delay. Trial calendar congestion in the New York metropolitan
areas can be characterized as certain, notorious, and chronic.40 The prob-
lem has been obvious and critical for several years, and has long been recog-
nized by the legislature. When the state legislature fails to provide the
funds necessary for the abatement of such an obviously chronic condition,
it fails to meet its constitutional obligation to afford an accused his right
to a speedy trial; the prosecution's good faith cannot excuse the legislature's
failure to meet that obligation. The fourteenth amendment guaranty of
due process of law, which now includes the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial, is not confined to the action of any particular individual or
agency, but applies to prejudicial state action of any kind.4 The purpose
of the guaranty is not to protect the integrity of the different branches of
state government or to accommodate judicial inefficiency but to protect
the rights of the accused. To allow calendar congestion to constitute good
cause for delay is to accomplish these ulterior results at the expense of the
purpose of the guarantee.42
' In fact, the majority in the instant case outlines a judicial method of alleviating
the congestion. See AuERICAN BAR ASS'N., STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL
(approved draft, 1958). There are many self-perpetuating intra-system delays which
a prompt trial would eliminate. For example, bail hearings, a tremendous cause for
delay, are necessary only because trial delays are so lengthy. Thus, as serious causes of
delay feed on their own delay, the problem is exacerbated. In the same fashion, how-
ever, strict requirement of a speedy trial would reduce these intrasystem causes.
'See AbiERICAN BAR ASS'N., STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (approved
draft, 1968).
" Id.
"People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 358 (1955). J. Fuld treats the fourteenth and
sixth amendment rights as inclusive.
"See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
" See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
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C. The Balance of the Accused's Right to a Speedy Trial and Questionable
Causes for Delay Should be Weighted in Favor of the Accused's Right
The majority's ad horrendum argument that to dismiss the defendant as
a method of forcing the legislature to appropriate the needed funds would
produce dire results is even less persuasive. It is a non sequitur to reason
that if the injustices of the system may be used in a manner deleterious to
the system, the injustices must be excused. It is inconsistent with our
constitutional system to solve problems facing the system by eliminating the
rights guaranteed by that system.4" The majority's rationale tips the bal-
ance in the wrong direction - questionable causes for delay should be re-
solved in favor of the constitutional right, not the fault in the system. The
majority's second argument cannot stand in the face of the fundamental
nature of the right to speedy trial and the source of the cause of the delay.44
Even if dire results were produced by dismissals for lack of speedy trial
caused by congested calendars, the constitutional mandate is clear. Point-
ing to dire results only begs the question of whether there has been a denial
of a speedy trial.
D. Policy Considerations Require that Calendar Congestion
Not Constitute Good Cause for Delay
The major arguments justifying congested trial calendars as good cause
for delay are refuted by the policy considerations underlying the right to a
speedy trial. The New York statutory and the federal constitutional speedy
trial guaranties were created to protect the accused, yet under Ganci, he
must bear the burden of the state's failure to maintain an efficient judicial
system. Such a holding makes little sense since the accused suffers equally
whether the delay is intentional or accidental, whether caused by prosecu-
torial laches or by a congested trial calendar. The impact is the same; a
fair trial is prevented.4" The existence of any prejudice that stems from
such delay is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence upon which
our system of criminal law is based."
IV
There has been an egregious failure on the part of many public officials
to properly anticipate calendar congestion problems and to adopt measures
necessary for their solution. To place the consequences of these failures on
The exclusionary rule has been the only workable means by which fourth amend-
ment rights have been enforced. It is obvious that no one would think of doing away
with the fourth amendment rights because criminals occasionally are released as a result
of a violation of that right.
' This is especially true for the facts of the instant case. The accused would not
be freed because he was already in prison on another charge.
"See United ex. rel. Frizer v: McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971) (Chronic
calendar congestion cannot excuse the denial of the defendant's right to a speedy trial.)
"See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text; Note, Extending Smith v. Hooey,
supra note 28.
4 Note, Extending Smith v. Hooey, supra note 25.
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the accused makes little practical or moral sense. The social repercussions
of dismissal could be minimized by prospective application of dismissal for
denial of speedy trial due to calendar congestion delay. Solving the prob-
lem of congested calendars by restricting the right to a speedy trial is an
unsatisfactory solution for a system that purports to hold up individual
freedoms of its citizens as its hallmark.
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
